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During the transition between administrations and the first few months of the Obama 
presidency, there has been a lot of talk — in Washington think tanks, universities and the 
foreign policy blogosphere — about how democracy assistance policy will be different in 
the new administration. The assumption for many was that the Bush administration had, 
if not started democracy assistance policies, then taken them to a new level of intensity 
which would be scaled back by a less ideological and more multilateral Obama 
presidency. 
This is, of course, far from reality because the story of democracy assistance since the 
end of the Cold War is more one of steady development and continuity than of radical 
change. Democracy assistance under Bush, particularly if one looks at cases other than 
Afghanistan and Iraq, differed from the previous administration in rhetoric far more than 
in substance. Although Bush talked a lot about elections, and had the annoying and naïve 
habit of referring to any country once it had an election as a “democracy,” the programs 
funded by his administrations had a similar combination of rule of law, civil society 
development and election support as they did during the Clinton administration. 
Moreover, while the middle four years of Bush’s eight year presidency gave democracy 
assistance a central rhetorical role in US foreign policy, even that receded during the last 
two years of his term. Given all of this, a more useful question to be asking would be how 
democracy assistance policy during the Obama years will be similar to what it was during 
the Bush years. 
It is admittedly a little bit of an “other than that Mrs. Lincoln, how was the show?” 
approach to exclude Iraq and Afghanistan from this analysis. However, extrapolating 
from these two important but somewhat unusual cases creates a very misleading picture 
of democracy assistance as a policy fueled by war and military adventurism rather than 
by diplomacy and financial and technical assistance. 
The challenge for the Obama administration is not to get rid of, or even revamp 
democracy assistance, but to return it to normalcy and encourage some modest changes to 
how we implement these policies. Democracy assistance should remain an important part 
of our foreign policy, but should no longer be ideologically charged or used as a post 
facto explanation for some of our biggest foreign policy blunders. Obama will be 
successful and democracy assistance will flourish if it is returned to the quiet role it had 
during the Clinton years when it enjoyed bipartisan support and was rarely interjected 
into partisan debates about foreign policy. 
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The mistakes of the Bush administration somewhat obscure some of the more important 
and confounding questions around democracy assistance. It is easy to deemphasize 
elections as the sine qua non of democracy, moderate rhetoric around democracy and 
delink it from a neoconservative political agenda. It is more difficult to make the 
technical adjustments necessary so that democracy assistance can once again play a 
constructive role in moving countries towards democracy and freedom as it did in the 
1990s, particularly given the changed global political realities we now face. These are the 
real challenges facing those working for democracy here and abroad. 
